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About a third of pregnant women in South Africa (SA) are thought 
to be HIV infected, and HIV/AIDS is said to be the leading contri 
butor to under-5 mortality (57%).1 The country has approximately 
280 000 children (ages 0 - 14) living with HIV,2 and the  vertical 
HIV transmission rate is thought to be about 25%.3 SA’s prevention 
of mother-to-child transmission (PMTCT) of HIV programme has 
been described as key to the survival of the country’s women and 
children, as it is thought that up-scaling PMTCT services (along 
with improved infant feeding) could save about 37 200 children 
annually.4 One challenge for the PMTCT programme, however, is 
the unsatisfactory uptake of HIV testing by pregnant women. Un-
der SA’s voluntary HIV testing policy, only about half of the 80% 
of pregnant women who have access to the PMTCT programme 
accept HIV testing, meaning that only about a third of HIV-infected 
women receive appropriate prophylactic antiretrovirals to prevent 
vertical transmission of HIV.5
To address the challenge of poor uptake, coercive HIV test-
ing of pregnant women in areas of high HIV prevalence such as 
SA, with functioning PMTCT programmes, has been suggested.6,7 
Some favour mandatory testing policies where HIV testing is re-
quired as part of  routine antenatal care services, while others 
support a system of routine testing under which the woman auto-
matically gets tested unless she opts out of the testing. These pro-
posals are supported by some evidence suggesting that coercive 
testing, in particular routine HIV testing, can increase PMTCT up-
take. A recent paper, for example, concludes that Botswana’s ’shift 
to routine HIV testing resulted in a dramatic increase in testing and 
in PMTCT service delivery without measurable adverse effects’, 
giving it the highest current uptake of any PMTCT programme in 
Africa.8 These approaches may, however, be regarded as coercive 
(or liberty limiting) as they both lack emphasis on extensive coun-
selling and informed consent procedures before HIV testing. As 
such they are not deemed sufficiently voluntary by some, includ-
ing the Health Professions Council of South Africa and the South 
African Medical Association.9 
Both consequentialist and non-consequentialist arguments 
have been advanced in rejection of coercive HIV testing. Among 
the latter, the autonomy argument stating that it is within wom-
en’s right to exercise their autonomy in not enrolling in such pro-
grammes is the most frequently cited.10 A version of the argument 
is as follows:11
1.    An HIV-positive mother has an independent personhood and 
identity as an individual. 
2.    This individuality is distinct from her status as a mother (or 
mother to be).
3.    This individuality gives her the same rights to autonomous life 
choices as men have, including a fundamental right to make 
health care decisions without having to think of her child first.
4.    Because of the above, policy makers should stop subsuming 
women under the identity of mother alone, but should disaggre-
gate women’s personhood from motherhood to enable women 
to be seen as individuals with their own individual interests and 
needs, not to be used as means to achieve children’s ends. 
5.    Programmes that do not recognise this violate women’s hu-
man rights. 
In advancing the case in favour of routine HIV testing in SA, 
this paper examines this autonomy argument and concludes that it 
is problematic, particularly when seen against a background con-
text of a public health intervention, the presence of other compet-
ing moral interests, and the context of a communitarian society. My 
analysis will focus on the following observations regarding this ar-
gument: (i) its inadequate attention to other moral considerations 
at play in the dilemma (which relates to its apparent conception 
of autonomy as supreme among other ethical principles); (ii) its 
emphasis on a more individualistic conception of the autonomous 
self; and (iii) its emphasis on the right to autonomy with little or no 
consideration on the content of the decision being made. Before 
deliberating on each of these, I begin with a short synopsis of au-
tonomy as a principle. Discussing the principle to the level and 
depth it warrants is, however, beyond the scope of this paper.  
The principle of autonomy
The principle of autonomy is among the four so-called mid-
level bioethical principles as popularised by Beauchamp and 
Childress.12 It has its underpinnings in the influential Kantian 
conception of human beings as rational beings with capacity to 
self-legislate, making them ends in themselves. In health care, this 
principle means that a mentally competent patient has a right to 
influence and partake in decisions concerning his/her treatment. 
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Seen this way, autonomy may be said to be procedural in that it 
represents a mechanism for ensuring the patient’s participation in 
treatment decisions.
A notable historical aspect of the current dominant interpreta-
tion of patient autonomy, as presented by Beauchamp and Chil-
dress for example, is that it emerged from a specific cultural con-
text of the USA, one that has been described as being liberal and 
individualistic.13 It is recognised that its interpretation as a concept 
may differ from one cultural context to the other and that transfer-
ring the American rendering of autonomy to other cultural contexts, 
unmodified, may be problematic.14 
Also of note is that while autonomy as a principle is influenced 
by Kant, it differs significantly from autonomy as conceived within 
Kant’s moral theory. For Kant, autonomy was supreme over all 
other principles. For principlism, however, autonomy is neither an 
absolute right nor a supreme principle that always takes priority 
over all other principles. Beauchamp and Childress themselves 
caution against and reject what they call a ‘misguided criticism’ of 
their account of the principle which holds that the right to autono-
my overrides all other moral considerations.12 It is the absence of 
these other considerations and how they interact with the pregnant 
woman’s autonomy that begins my criticism of the autonomy argu-
ment. Its lack of an account of the weighing of the different moral 
interests involved, showing how autonomy ultimately triumphs 
against all the other interests, signals exactly the construction of 
autonomy cautioned against above. 
The competing moral considerations
One of the impacts of technological developments in obstetric 
medicine is the transformation of the clinical status of the fetus.15 
Technologies such as ultrasonography and fetal tissue sampling 
mean that the fetus, which was once approached inferentially, can 
now have its own diagnoses and doctors can now interact with it 
in clear distinction from its host. As Mattingly notes,15 these tech-
nologies have shifted emphasis ‘from unity to duality’, with most 
doctors arguably now regarding the fetus ‘as a distinct patient in 
its own right’. Under the preceding one-patient obstetric model, in 
which the pregnant woman was considered one complex patient 
of which the fetus was an integral part, the ethics were relatively 
easy to handle. The new two-patient model has, however, pre-
sented questions about how the familiar principles of beneficence, 
non-maleficence and autonomy ought to operate in such a unique 
doctor-patient relationship.15 The obstetrician, as a professional 
and moral agent him/herself, has ethical obligations not only to 
the pregnant woman but to the fetus as well, and of course ethical 
dilemmas may arise when the interests of the woman conflict with 
those that may be accorded to the fetus. 
It is not my intention to go any further into the ethical com-
plexities arising from such a conception of the obstetric patient. My 
purpose was simply to indicate that this is a complex area in which 
appealing to one principle only (i.e. autonomy) is bound to be un-
helpful, especially when such a principle is not absolute. Consid-
erations of justice for the unborn child, an interplay between the 
woman’s interests and the ‘interests’ of the fetus, and the ethical 
obligations of the doctor to the two patients all seem to contribute 
significantly to the moral dilemma. I now turn to some of these dif-
ferent competing interests. 
The interests of the fetus 
The principle of beneficence places a moral obligation on the doc-
tor to act for the benefit of both the mother and the fetus. Although 
the fetus itself may controversially be said to have no interests 
of its own, the interests and rights of the person it will become 
cannot lightly be dismissed, particularly when the woman wishes 
to take the pregnancy to term. The woman’s decision to take the 
pregnancy to term is significant, as it shifts matters from issues of 
moral status of prenatal life and whether there is a moral obliga-
tion on the woman to carry the pregnancy to term (i.e. the abortion 
debate) to questions about the welfare of the baby she intends 
to give birth to. A duty not to cause harm needlessly could thus 
still be violated even though the harm in this case only expresses 
itself much later. In arguing for the plausibility of prenatal inter-
ests and harms, for example, Feinberg16 gives an anecdote of a 
motorist who in running over a pregnant woman causes damage 
to the fetus, which is later born deformed. Here it could be said 
that the child’s future interest of self-locomotion has been affected 
during his/her prenatal life. For PMTCT it could be argued, as has 
been done in another paper,7 that according to the harm principle, 
and except where there is a genuine fear of partner violence, not 
enrolling in PMTCT may amount to wrongful harm to the unborn 
baby. Given that the right to autonomy may be rightly overruled if it 
results in harm to others, the recognition that harm to others may 
still be defined even where a fetus is involved should at least mod-
erate strong claims to autonomy accorded to the mother. 
The woman’s interests
What may be regarded as the pregnant woman’s interests, which 
when respected allow her not to enrol in PMTCT, may be taken to 
be what are usually cited as ‘barriers’ to participating in PMTCT 
programmes. These typically include factors such as fear of 
stigma, fear of knowing one’s HIV status, not trusting health care 
workers, fear of breaches of confidentiality, and fear of lack of part-
ner support.3 A general comment can be made that from a pro-
grammatic point of view there is no reason why these barriers in 
themselves should stop coercive HIV testing; they merely suggest 
that any coercive HIV testing programme needs to have specific 
in-built mechanisms to address each of these barriers.  
At another level may also be the question whether any one of 
these barriers (or indeed any other reason that does not translate 
into a threat to the woman’s life) should count as a valid considera-
tion for not acting to benefit the unborn baby. Let us illustrate this 
with what is apparently the commonest barrier to testing: the fear 
of knowing one’s HIV status. Is fear of sufficient weight to prevent 
measures that could potentially save the baby’s life and prevent 
future suffering? As is the case with most fears its rationality is 
questionable in HIV testing, given that even if one does not test 
during pregnancy and the child is infected, the HIV test will be 
inescapable when the disease eventually expresses itself. Even 
if knowing one’s status was escapable, it would be dubious for 
the woman to make a choice that puts her future child directly at 
risk of the things she herself fears. Arguably the mother, possess-
ing better coping mechanisms as an adult, is the one in a better 
position to deal with the challenges of living with HIV. One could 
indeed also question whether such decisions influenced by fear 
should even be counted as autonomous, particularly in this case 
where the rejection of HIV testing actually undermines personal 
    Article
64         December 2010, Vol. 3, No. 2  SAJBL
autonomy in itself as it threatens the existence of the very agent 
that is exercising autonomy.
The public’s interest
Public health practice has been construed as consisting of collec-
tive interventions that aim to promote and protect the health of the 
public.17 Public health therefore concerns itself with general soci-
etal well-being, rather than specific outcomes for any specific in-
dividual.17 While in clinical medicine an individual, in exercising in-
formed consent, performs their own risk-benefit analysis to decide 
what to do, based on their own personal situations and beliefs, it 
is problematic in public health as the benefits (as well as the data 
on benefits) relate to the public, rather than to any individual per 
se. As a good from an individual’s point of view may not necessar-
ily be a good from a public health point of view, it may at times be 
counter-productive to give individuals, through elaborate informed 
consent procedures, opportunities to choose to abstain from pro-
grammes designed to safeguard the public interest. 
Presumably for SA the rationale for the establishment of the 
country’s PMTCT programme was the public health concern over 
premature deaths of children as a result of HIV. Once the pro-
gramme was established in 2001 to reduce the nation’s HIV-relat-
ed mortality and morbidity in children, it was now the individual’s 
imperative to contribute to its attainment. This public health dimen-
sion further compromises the autonomy argument. Public health 
interventions, as already suggested, are almost by definition in-
compatible with strong claims of personal autonomy. As  Bayer 
and Fairchild18 have observed, population-based health measures 
require ‘… a willingness to recognize that the ethics of collective 
health may require far more extensive limitations … on liberty … 
than would be justified from the perspective of the autonomy-fo-
cused orientation of the dominant current in bioethics’. Of course 
there is no suggestion here that just because a case can be lo-
cated within the public health context it should be insensitive to the 
protection of human rights, where that can be helped.
From such perspective, the autonomy argument appears to 
suffer a contextual problem; its advancement within a public health 
debate (where public goods precede individual claims) appears 
to be out of place. Moreover, individualistic approaches may be 
even more questionable when seen against the extraordinary rav-
ages of HIV/AIDS in SA. As Clark has argued elsewhere using the 
concept of proportionate reason, the good that may result from 
collectivist and coercive approaches, namely the preservation of 
the lives of children and their mothers through preventing perina-
tal transmission of HIV and allowing infected mothers to get early 
treatment, may sufficiently compensate for the apparent evil of 
overriding personal autonomy rights.6
The individualistic autonomous self
The apparent tension between individual interest and public in-
terest brings me to another issue presented by the autonomy ar-
gument: the individualistic asocial self. By asking us to separate 
motherhood and the individual, the autonomy argument appears 
to appeal to a rather de-socialised conception of the autonomous 
self; a self commonly labelled ‘atomistic’. Tauber19 defines the ato-
mistic self as one that ‘maintains that underlying our social identi-
ties is a deeper inner sense of identity, one that is, in a sense, 
isolated and inviolate’. 
Ironically, even the liberals who advocate for individual auto- 
nomy reject such a view of the autonomous individual. Beauchamp 
and Childress,12 for example, note that the autonomy they defend 
‘… is not excessively individualistic (neglecting the social nature 
of individuals and the impact of individual choices and actions on 
others) …’. Feinberg20 also observes that ‘[i]t is impossible to think 
of human beings except as part of ongoing communities, defined 
by reciprocal bonds of obligation, common traditions, and institu-
tions’. Indeed it is unclear how we can ever realistically think of 
a pregnant woman as an un-pregnant individual, or not a moth-
er-to-be. An autonomous agent, it seems, is neither excessively 
individualistic nor is it one of totalitarian socialism; it is, as Fein-
berg20 suggests, one in which the individual’s self determination ‘is 
as complete as is consistent with the requirement that he is … a 
member of a community’. 
Against this background, the present case may be construed 
not wholly as a case of denial of autonomy but perhaps as an 
argument about the social conception of  motherhood. Should the 
mother-child relationship be something that should be left up to 
individual assessment and choice, or is it something whose ends 
society should determine? A richer argument, it seems, is not one 
that tries to shed off the social ties or expectations but one that 
demonstrates how it has given such expectations due considera-
tion. 
Another issue is the deeper theoretical question regarding the 
form that personal autonomy should take in communal societies 
such as exist in SA. Should the local morality ultimately decide what 
is to be considered private (and therefore a protected sphere), or 
is the American individualistic interpretation of personal autonomy 
to be regarded as a global yardstick for how autonomy should be 
interpreted and defined? In the communitarian ubuntu societies 
of southern Africa it is perhaps even harder to see how claims of 
desocialised individualism can ever be tenable. 
Concluding remarks 
My overarching critique of the autonomy argument so far has 
largely not been on whether the woman has the right to autonomy 
or not; rather it is on whether the autonomous decision not to test 
is one that deserves to be respected. It is a critique of the con-
tents of the decision: is the decision reasonable considering the 
unborn baby’s interests, the public health interests, and the social 
expectations and responsibilities attached to expectant mothers? 
Such questions broadly challenge the notion of autonomy as a 
purely procedural and content-neutral exercise that focuses only 
on identifying those with the right to autonomy but neglects the ac-
tual contents of the autonomous choices made. Evidently a more 
productive development on the debate on autonomy rights and 
coercive HIV testing would be a shift of emphasis from the right to 
autonomy to the ethics of the actual autonomous decision of the 
pregnant mother to opt out of PMTCT. 
 We are led to the conclusion that if coercive HIV testing is mor-
ally unjustifiable, it is not on account of the fact that it undermines 
personal autonomy as presented. For the autonomy argument to 
have sufficient moral force, it has to enrich its conception of au-
tonomy to one that best reflects the complexity of the competing 
moral values at hand. Such a rich concept of autonomy is one in 
which exercising autonomy is not merely procedural, but also one 
that considers the contents of the decisions being made, one not 
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excessively individualistic but one that recognises that individuals 
exist as social beings attached to social roles which embody within 
them certain expectations, and finally one that does not conceive 
of itself as inviolable or absolute. 
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